

**AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN P. FREID**

Before me, the undersigned authority, appeared who being first duly sworn, says:

1. My name is Brian Freid. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and in all respects am competent to make this Affidavit.

2. I am personally familiar with the facts stated herein based upon my personal knowledge and review.

3. I am providing this affidavit of my own free will, without any coercion or offer of any compensation.

4. I am a citizen of Orange County, Florida.

5. I was the Information Systems Director of the Orange County Supervisor of Elections (SOE) in Orlando, Florida from June 1, 2020, until my involuntary termination on October 14, 2022.

6. In the regular performance of my job functions, I have personal knowledge of the operation of and the circumstances surrounding the preparation, maintenance, and retrieval of voter information that is used during the election process.

7. I became aware of have personal knowledge of security issues that arose beginning in March of 2022, which consisted of, and my not be limited to:

a. The improper management, creation and handling of thumb drives that contained unredacted voter information. These thumb drives are used to load the voter data onto the electronic poll books for the election. The data consists of, but is not limited to, the person's name, address, date of birth, voter identification, county, registration data, party, precinct, municipality, voting status, and vote by mail indicator. The unredacted voter information includes all 4,100 protected voters in Orange County, Florida, which

includes politicians, judges, police, fire fighters and domestic abuse victims;

- b. The existence of pirated software on an employee's computer; and
- c. The improper and potentially illegal use of administrative privileges

allowing for the accessing of employee computers, emails and all SOE systems, networks, data and voter signatures.

8. The foregoing security issues arose in March of 2022, which led to the internal investigation for subsequent discovery of the aforementioned security concerns. Please see attached **Exhibit 1**.

9. As a result of the investigation, it was reported in the West Orlando News that a crisis management consultant was hired who participated in a November 8th canvassing board meeting, acting as the Recording Secretary. Please see **Exhibit 2** attached hereto.

10. A true and correct copy of an investigation of the creation of ePoll book thumb drives is attached hereto as **Exhibit 3**.

11. A true and correct copy of the forensic audit conducted by Redbeard is not attached but is in the possession of the SOE's office.

12. I also have in my possession, but am in the process of returning to the SOE, two (2) separate thumb drives which were created by former SOE employee (Elections Manager) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], and current SOE employee (Technical Services Manager), [REDACTED], which contain:

a. **Drive 1:** a database to be used by the ePoll books. This database contains all the unredacted voter data that was used for the 2020 presidential primary election. The thumb drive is not encrypted, but the database is password protected. The database contains the unredacted voter information including, but not limited to, name, address, date of birth, voter identification, county, registration date, party, precinct, municipality, voting status, and vote by mail indicator.

b. **Drive 2:** a database to be used by the ePoll books. This database contains all the unredacted voter data that was used for the 2020 presidential general election. The thumb drive is not encrypted, but the database is password protected. The database contains

the unredacted voter information including, but not limited to, name, address, date of birth, voter identification, county, registration date, party, precinct, municipality, voting status, and vote by mail indicator.

13. These thumb drives were retrieved in May of this year in case they were needed during the State's investigation into the exfiltration of data. They were placed in a folder along with my personal notes on the investigation and forgotten.

14. On my last day of employment with the SOE and when I was clearing items from my desk, I took the folder with my personal notes on the investigation but did not notice the thumb drives.

15. The folder has been secured in a safety deposit box and was not thought about until correspondence from the SOE's attorney brought it to memory. As a result, I am in the process of returning the thumb drives and receiving a receipt of their return.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing affidavit, consisting of three (3) pages, and that the facts stated herein are true.

[Redacted Signature]

Brian P. Freid

STATE OF FLORIDA  
COUNTY OF ORANGE

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 17th day of November, 2022 by Margarette Lively (name of person acknowledging), who is **personally known to me** or who has produced [Redacted] (type of identification) as identification.


[Redacted Signature]  
Signature of Notary Public  
Notary Public State of Florida  
Margarette Lively  
My Commission  
HH 247373  
Exp. 4/25/2026

Print, Type, or Stamp

SEAL



*[Faint, illegible handwritten text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]*



## TABLE OF EVENTS

A full time staff member asks the programming manager for a thumb drive containing a database containing all voter information so they can build the municipal electronic poll books. This is not the normal process!

1st week of March 2022 When I asked the Technical Service Manager they along with the elections manager assure me that the employee didn't understand the request because he is new and they would address it. I then raised my concerns to Bill Cowles and he assured me that it wasn't an issue and the person was new and didn't understand the process. The Technical Service Manager and the elections manager had been the ones in charge of creating the electronic poll books for the past 10+ years.

4/27/2022 Bill Cowles goes on Vacation

4/28/2022 The CFO requests Bill Cowles approval access in financial system because she couldn't approve requisitions in Bill's queue

4/28/2022 The Systems Administrator is asked to reach out to the previous financial systems expert (the elections manager at the time) on how to make change

4/28/2022 Conversation does not take place

4/28/2022 The Systems Administrator has conversation with representative from financial systems who stated the CFO already had been given permissions

4/29/2022 The Systems Administrator is notified that Bill's signature went missing from financial systems

5/2/2022 IS Director asks The Systems Administrator to reach out to financial systems to identify who made the change

5/2/2022 A representative from financial systems informed the Systems Administrator that their system doesn't keep track of those changes and couldn't identify who made the changes

5/5/2022 IS Director received multiple emails from financial system that were intended for Elections Director

5/5/2022 Brought to the CFO 's attention and verified emails should have been sent to Elections Director

Systems Administrator informs the IT Manager and the IS Director that someone from outside of the IT department made the changes.

Brought to Bill Cowles attention informing him that the IS Directors plans on investigating the issue found.

5/6/2022 the CFO and The Systems Administrator were off on Friday

5/9/2022 IS Director spent the day creating security training materials for Tuesday's (5/10/2022) all staff meeting

5/10/2022 IS Director requested The IT Manager and the Systems Administrator to investigate reason behind incorrect financial systems emails

5/11/2022 IS Director entered ticket in help desk (8142)

5/11/2022 Discovered ISAdmin had Delegated rights to upper management mailbox's (should not have happened, big security issue)

5/11/2022 Alerted Upper management & SOE of security concern (IS Director informed SOE of what was found and that investigation would continue to validate if any improper activities had taken place)

5/11/2022 IS Director decided to start investigation, not changing anything to avoid 'cover-ups' (IS Director authorized actions)

5/11/2022 Started capturing pictures of mailboxes and delegations

5/11/2022 Added ISAdmin account to local computer and was able to replicate issue

5/11/2022 Searched for residual files (.ost/.pst/.xml) files in employee computers to identify possible 'offenders'

5/11/2022 Ran M365 Audit scripts to see which mailboxes were delegated. Limited to 1 year history due to licensing (E1) and retention policies

Spoke with Bill Cowles and SOE Attorney about finding Bill's personal file on Elections Manager laptop which included wedding pictures of his son and pictures of his grandson(s). Suggested immediate termination of Elections Manager based on findings of multiple mailboxes (including SOE and CFO) as well as their data files and multiple instances of pirated software.

5/11/2022 Bill Cowles decides not to act on this issue, but for the investigation to continue.

5/12/2022 Running M365 Audits to find more correlations (logged IPs, password change, read message types/users)

Division Directors Meeting (We started to discuss the topic, but because we were still investigating things we tabled the topic. Brian suggested that I not attend the FSE conference so I could be on site to continue the investigation.)

5/12/2022 Running NINJA scripts against ALL computers and noticed software has been disabled

5/12/2022 Decision was made by IS Director to physically inspect ALL computers that had NINJA disabled and inspection will take place on 5/14/2022

5/12/2022 Located 'suspect' .PST files in some users' computers

5/12/2022 Imported .PST from backups from some users and immediately found confidential correspondences related to lawsuits and other confidential emails, salary messages, and other confidential information in the PST files

5/12/2022 Other .PST's show ALL e-mails from Bill's mailbox in the last few years, copied as late as 5/12

5/12/2022 Inspected ALL computers and found 2 with suspect names. Pulled .PST and .OST files at IS Director's direction

5/12/2022 Had interviews for facility coordinator position where there was a medical situation that needed attention (this took priority)

5/13/2022 Ran PowerShell commands to obtain logs of who connected to mailbox via Delegated access using EAC Compliance--- folders accesses as of 05/13.

5/13/2022 Downloaded & Extracted some e-mail messages via OST2 program -- did not find any suspect e-mails on 2nd user's mailbox

5/13/2022 IT Director provided a situational report to the SOE on progress

5/14/2022 Searched and captured images of user's DTA (backup) Outlook folders, if found on machine

5/15/2022 Performed another full search of computers for Outlook files and other files possible containing confidential data

5/16/2022 Ran Audit of forwarded emails from first users mailbox and ISADMIN mailbox going back 10 years

5/16/2022 Presented results and recommendations to upper management for guidance on further action

5/16/2022 Held meeting with the CFO, IT manager, Elections Director, Bill Cowles, HR Attorney to review events from 5/11/2022 to 5/16/2022

During the course of the meeting, the CFO mentioned that she thought someone was reading her emails. Again it was recommended that the Elections Manager be terminated, the SOE employees be notified of potential identity exfiltration and that they be provided 1 year of identity monitoring.

5/16/2022 During the course of the meeting options were discussed and it was decided by Bill Cowles that Elections Manager would be placed on administrative leave

5/16/2022 Held meeting with the CFO, IS Director, IT manager, Elections Director, and SOE Attorney to review events from 5/1/2022 to 5/16/2022 and the IT Director and IT Manager expressed the need to have an independent investigation by a 3rd party company regarding the incidents

5/16/2022 On the afternoon of the 16, Elections Manager was out at an event in the UCF Like Oak Ballroom with Bill Cowles and others

5/16/2022 While Elections Manager was at the event at UCF, Elections Director and IS Director retrieved Elections Manager's iPad and Dell Latitude laptop from his office and placed under lock and key

Upon his return a meeting took place with the CFO, SOE Attorney, Elections Director and Elections Manager. Elections Manager was informed that he'd be placed on administrative leave pending the results of an investigation.

5/16/2022 Elections Manager turned in his badge, office cell phone (iPhone) and was escorted out of the building.

5/16/2022 Elections Manager active directory password was changed so he could not log into his account

5/16/2022 Elections Manager remaining equipment was seized by IS Director and IT manager and locked in a secure cabinet (tower, laptop, external drive)

5/16/2022 The privileges for iSAdmin was changed.

5/16/2022 A meeting was held with Bill Cowles, IS Director, Elections Director, the CFO and SOE Attorney. During the course of that meeting it was decided to bring a 3rd party company to conduct an independent investigation to determine the extent of any security breach before reporting to outside authorities.

5/16/2022 IS Director asked The Systems Administrator and IT manager to investigate potential cyber investigation companies who we could hire to investigate

5/16/2022 IS Director reviewed potential companies and began reaching out to the higher rated ones and made contact with RedBeard Intelligence & Investigations

5/16/2022 IS Director called IT manager and shut off Sonic Wall Net Extender so nobody could VPN into our network.

5/17/2022 IS Director signed contract for them to begin investigation

5/17/2022 Elections Manager returned Apple MacBook and provided access codes to iPad, iPhone, and Voicemail password

5/17/2022 IT manager changed passwords on networking equipment (SonicWall, Juniper Switches)

5/18/2022 The Systems Administrator investigated who had privileges to VPN into our network ... during which some individuals were removed who didn't need access.

5/19/2022 3rd party security investigation company was on site imaging all Elections Manager's computers and external drive

5/19/2022 3rd party security investigation company toured the building, identified potential risks of spy equipment on site as well as changing locks to conference room and IS Closet door

5/19/2022 IS Director met with Bill Cowles to discuss finding and suggestions. Bill decided to conclude current investigation before sweeping for spy equipment.

5/20/2022 IS Director met with Technical Services Manager to discuss electronic poll books application, the hardware, thumb drives and history of its development (See Other Log for details)

5/20/2022 IS Director purchased some eye gate hooks and installed them on the conference room door as well as the IS closet door

5/20/2022 IS Director sent email to Orange County Facilities to change out the locks on the doors afore mentioned

5/20/2022 IS Director Copied investigation table onto thumb drive to take home and update. The thumb drive this data is stored on will be kept with the original thumb drive.

5/20/2022 A meeting was held between IS Director, The Systems Administrator and IT manager to validate accuracy of this log. Once validated it will be locked to updates and a new version of this document will be created to continue documentation of events and findings.

5/23/2022 A meeting was held between IS Director, Elections Director, The Systems Administrator and IT manager to validate accuracy of this log. Once validated it will be locked to updates and a new version of this document will be created to continue documentation of events and findings.

Before close of business, IS Director and Elections Director will be searching Elections Manager office for thumb drives, hard drives, and electronic media and placing them under lock and key along with the other evidence

5/23/2022 Elections Director took a print out copy of an e-mail received from Elections Manager on 5/20 to the CFO/HR Manager the CFO, who was going to fax the message to the HR Attorney for further direction

5/23/2022 IS Director placed a ticket to have the exterior door locks sealed

County worker informed IS Director that we couldn't seal the exterior doors as they may be needed in an emergency. Instead the IS Director requested Facilities change all exterior door locks. There was also a service request sent to Johnson Controls to verify the alarms are working as expected on conference room door and IS closet. Ticket entered by 1:46PM.

5/23/2022 IS Director entered ticket to have Conference room door's bricked up. There is no reason for these doors and allow flooding in the conference room during heavy rains.

5/23/2022 Have discussed with team the need to transition for focusing on this issue to supporting our office. There are many tasks that need to be accomplish for the pending elections in August and we need to focus on that and allow RedBeard to provide an update on their investigation. Will reach out to them on Thursday (date they may know something) and get an update.

The 3rd party investigation company finds proof of pirated software, downloading and accessing of multiple mailboxes (some of which included PCI, PII, HIPAA and financial information of employees). The report is shared with Bill Cowles

6/3/2022 Bill Cowles decides to allow the Elections Manager to resign and directs the IS director and the Elections Director to handle things.

6/10/2022 Elections Manager Resigns ... 1 month paid administrative leave and full benefits

6/17/2022 During the course of that exit interview the Elections Manager insisted that it was the previous IS Director who instructed him and the Technical Services Manager to download the data on the thumb drives and they were just following orders.

Exhibit 1

During the course of the internal investigation there were reports of anywhere from 1 to 6 thumb drives that were lost over the years. The exact number is unknown because there was no tracking/management of the thumb drives. Each thumb drive contained the data base with voter information for ALL voters in Orange County. The thumb drive was not encrypted and the data was not redacted, so all 4,100 + confidential voters had their names, addresses, dates of birth and other personal information on them.

The thumb drives were given to temporary employees on either the Saturday or Monday before the election and they were allowed to take them home with them.

The thumb drives were created by temporary employees reporting to the Technical Service Manager. The password for the database had not been changed for many years (5+ maybe as many as 10). There was no tracking or management of thumb drives created by temporary employees, so there is no way of knowing how many may have been lost or stolen.

**The only way to know for sure if any of the data has been exfiltrated is to interview the people involved (elections manager and technical service manager) which I don't believe has been done as well as search the dark web and I'm pretty confident this has not been done either.**

The following is the header information for many of the emails (in the same email thread) of who I reached out to and when.

From: Brian Freid <[REDACTED]>  
Sent: Thursday, June 9, 2022 9:00 PM

To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: Bill Cowles [REDACTED]

Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2022 8:25 PM  
To: [REDACTED]

Sent: Sunday, July 10, 2022 4:55 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Tuesday, July 12, 2022 12:05 PM

To: Brian Freid <[REDACTED]>  
Cc: [REDACTED]

From: Brian Freid <[REDACTED]>  
Sent: Tuesday, July 12, 2022 9:17 PM

To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, July 13, 2022 12:46 PM

To: Brian Freid <[REDACTED]>  
Cc: [REDACTED]

August was the primaries and consumed all our time, so follow up emails were sent at this time to the state or Cyber Navigators.

From: Brian Freid <[REDACTED]>  
Sent: Thursday, September 1, 2022 8:44 AM

To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]

From: Brian Freid  
Sent: Thursday, September 1, 2022 12:47 PM

Exhibit 1

To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]

From: Brian Freid <[REDACTED]>  
Sent: Thursday, September 8, 2022 9:57 AM

To: [REDACTED]

From: Brian Freid <[REDACTED]>  
Sent: Thursday, September 8, 2022 10:40 AM

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] Sends contact information for the department of homeland security because they did not have the resources to investigate the dark web for data exfiltration.  
Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2022 4:01 PM  
To: Brian Freid <[REDACTED]>

From: Brian Freid <[REDACTED]>  
Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2022 5:31 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Placed on administrative leave on 9/23/2022 so the remaining emails were sent from my personal account.

From: Brian Freid <[REDACTED]>  
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2022 8:58 AM

To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]

From: Brian Freid <[REDACTED]>  
Sent: Thursday, October 6, 2022 12:17 PM

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, October 6, 2022 3:11 PM

To: [REDACTED]



## Supervisor of Elections Bill Cowles Hires Media, Crisis Management Consultant

By Editor November 6, 2022



Orange County Supervisor of Elections Bill Cowles has hired a media, communications and crisis management consultant at a non-refundable service fee of \$150/hour, nearly ten times the pay of many current local election workers. Cowles already signed a \$5,000 check as a retainer.

Supervisor Cowles is also currently under pressure from [bombshell whistleblower claims](#) and multiple [elections fraud complaints](#) under review by the state, along with several other ongoing investigations. Mica got involved directly in the response when the Democrat Supervisor of Elections was questioned about [Cowles' son working for his election equipment vendor](#).

The contract with grasshopper media and consultant D'Anne Mica lists an effective date of Monday, October 17, 2022. West Orlando News made the first public records request to Supervisor Cowles' office related to the whistleblower claims on Friday, October 14th. Cowles signed the contract himself on October 27th, and issued a \$5,000 check from the Supervisor of Elections office to Mica on October 28th. Mica indicated she was aware of West Orlando News' records requests and media requests, and is working directly with Supervisor Cowles.

"This Letter of Agreement, when signed, shall cover media, communications and crisis management work performed for OCSOE by D'Anne Mica/grasshopper media as determined by the Supervisor of Elections," the agreement states. The agreement will continue through December 31, 2022, unless terminated sooner by providing a 15-day advance notice.

The longtime Democrat Supervisor of Elections Bill Cowles seems to be facing pressure to spend so much taxpayer money on a private crisis management consultant.

Here's a copy of Bill Cowles media and crisis management contract with D'Anne Mica, and the \$5,000 check issued by the Supervisor of Elections:



October 14, 2020

To: County  
Orange County Supervisor's Office  
100 West County Street  
Orlando, FL 32801

Re: Letter of Agreement between Orange County Supervisor's Office (OS) and Grasshopper Media (GMM)

Grasshopper Media (GMM) is pleased to enter into an agreement to serve as crisis response and communications support for the Orange County Supervisor's Office (OS).

The purpose of this agreement is to provide crisis response and communications support for the OS in the event of a crisis. This agreement is subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the attached Letter of Agreement and the terms and conditions of the services performed under the Letter of Agreement.

The effective date of this agreement is October 14, 2020. This agreement will continue in full force and effect through September 30, 2021, unless terminated earlier.

**Term:** The term of this agreement is 12 months, commencing on the date of execution of this agreement. The services to be provided under this agreement shall be provided on a month-to-month basis. The OS may terminate this agreement at any time without cause.

Grasshopper Media (GMM) shall provide crisis response and communications support for the OS in the event of a crisis. The manner in which the services are to be performed and the specific hours to be worked by Grasshopper Media (GMM) shall be determined by Grasshopper Media (GMM).

**Additional Service Expenses:** Grasshopper Media (GMM) shall be responsible for all costs associated with the provision of services under this agreement, including but not limited to travel, lodging, meals, and other expenses. The OS shall reimburse Grasshopper Media (GMM) for all such costs within 30 days of the date of the invoice.

**Force Majeure:** This agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the Florida Uniform Consumer Warranty Act (FCUWIA).

**OS's Right to Audit:** The OS shall have the right to audit the books and records of Grasshopper Media (GMM) to verify the accuracy of the invoices submitted by Grasshopper Media (GMM).

**Assignment:** Grasshopper Media (GMM) shall not assign or subcontract its obligations under this agreement without the prior written consent of the OS.

The agreement does state grasshopper media will "keep an activity report with corresponding work hours to track internally, which will be summarized in the monthly invoices." That should make those reports subject to Florida Sunshine laws once completed. "The manner in which the services are to be performed and the specific hours to be worked by grasshopper media shall be determined by grasshopper media," the agreement states.

### UPDATES: Election Integrity Crisis: Supervisor Bill Cowles

### RELATED: Corruption Cowles? Supervisor of Elections' Son Works for Equipment Vendor

### Exhibit 3

## Investigation into the creation of ePoll Books thumb drives

- Because of the events chronicled in the 'Investigation Table of Events', concern was raised by the IS director over security and processes relating to the thumb drive creation and usage.
- OCVotes is a poll book solution that was created in by the SOE office to be used in the voting process. It interfaces with FVRS and contains the entire voter registration database. Similar to VR's EVID's.
- It was because of afore mentioned concern that the IS director began investigating the possibility of security issues relating to the creation and use of the thumb drives.
- On 5/20 a meeting was held and a discussion took place between the IS director and the Manager of Technical services. This meeting was to discuss the history of OCVotes, the evolution of the thumb drives and the processes and security around its creation and usage. The pretext was that the discussion was related to the security audit performed earlier in the year by our Cyber Navigator.
- The meeting only included these 2 team members because:
  - The Manager of Technical Services and the person in question are good friends and I didn't want to elude to the fact that an investigation was taking place or the reason why.
  - The purpose of the meeting was down played as more of a conversation regarding what can be done to improve the security of the tablets and thumb drive builds. A request was made to provide historical information of how the product matured and how we ended up in our current state.
- The following are bullet point notes (as told by the Manager of Technical Services) of that meeting:
  - The system was created approximately 14 or more years ago using laptops and air cards.
  - The original system was developed by [REDACTED]. The HDOP's would be given a laptop the night before the election and would pull updates from our network. There was a report to indicate that an update had been successful, but no reports or security showing if the data had been off loaded. During this time they had also begun creating backup systems & thumb drives.
  - [REDACTED] had stated that [REDACTED] was able to create a pilot of the primary/secondary architecture approach and that it was working; but [REDACTED] didn't trust the technology and relied on the thumb drive approach. This was approximately 12 years ago.
  - Approximately 8 years ago [REDACTED] move away from laptops and moved to tablets (G1, G2, and Microsoft Pro) and began using MIFI's to connect to the SOE network.
  - There was some discussion between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] regarding the use of a primary/secondary architecture, but it was decided not to move in that direction, but instead use thumb drives. Revisit of the work mentioned above.
  - Prior to the start of early voting, a build of the database is performed by [REDACTED] at the time and afterward the programming team; which is then placed on a file share for the tech services team to download onto the tablets.
  - A database extract is done of all voter registration data and that information is used to populate the ePoll Books. That process is performed in the warehouse where tech services lead [REDACTED] had little oversight and little to none security checks and balances.
  - Once Early Voting had completed a new build is done where we identify those voters who have voted early or by VBM. A new build is performed and a new database is placed on the shared drive. (Brian Freid) had previously been informed that this was in incremental build, but it's not. It's another complete build of all voter records.
  - On the Monday before the election the HDOP's would get their ePoll tablet along with a thumb drive containing ALL updated voter registration records.
  - Initial concerns raised during this meeting were:
    - This data is password protected, but the password was kept in keypass (a tool for documenting login's and passwords) and many people have had access to it over the years. The DB password also has not been change in years and it is not encrypted.
    - The thumb drive is not password protected or encrypted.

### Exhibit 3

## Investigation into the creation of ePoll Books thumb drives

- The process of creating the thumb drives needs to be investigated more closely because it's unsure if there is a count of the number of thumb drives created.
- The Technical Services manager mentioned that the office did lose a thumb drive around 2012 and this was reported to ██████ but no follow up was done.
- Over time the security process has improved where pouches were created to hold the thumb drives and are now verifying the return of every thumb drive. But the security process is still lacking and NEVER clearly defined by tech services.
- In 2016 ██████ introduced a bug into the database right before the election and required that all the techs had to go out to all voting sites and revert the data base to its previous version. This required taking a thumb drive containing the entire data base and update every ePoll tablet. ██████ was adamant about the fact that only full time staff could take the thumb drives off premises.
- The Technical Services manager also stated that there have been times in the past where they needed the data base for testing, so there are adhoc thumb drives created and little to no tracking of the data.
- Currently they create 247 thumb drives, one for each HDOP as well as 32 for field techs, but there may be additional ones floating around for testing
- ██████ along with a developer named ██████ created the initial OCVotes and the processes associated with burning thumb drives and loading media.
  - ██████ stated that he expressed concerns, but was reminded his role was to find ██████ to support the ePoll book
- ██████ was the person who performed all of the builds herself till she left, then it was turned over to the programming team.
- No checks and balances in place, but in 2020 moved to new thumb drives process to improve tracking
- Have since begun tracking thumb drives that go out and ensuring they are returned
- Next step will be to begin placing bar codes on the thumb drives to allow for scanning drives out to individuals and scanning them in.

### Exhibit 3

## Investigation into the creation of ePoll Books thumb drives

- On 5/24 a meeting was held and a discussion took place between the IS director, the Director of Election Administration and the Programming manager.
- The following are bullet point notes (as told by the Manager of Programming) of that meeting:
  - During the March municipal election (1<sup>st</sup> week of March 2022) a service technician [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] for a thumb drive containing the voting database for the ePoll books.
  - When returning from lunch, [REDACTED] was made aware of the request.
  - The technician mentioned that the programming team had always provided the thumb drive previously.
  - [REDACTED] then called [REDACTED] on his cell phone, but there was no answer. She then called him on his desk phone and again no answer. [REDACTED] has a work cell phone that is always with him and his desk phone forwards to his work phone.
  - [REDACTED] then informed the IS director of these events and was visibly upset by the incident.
  - The IS director didn't understand the scope of the security risk because he was misinformed how the process worked. This misunderstanding was clarified later and is documented below.
  - The IS director misunderstood the situation and thought that [REDACTED] was upset because her team NEVER created a thumb drive and that someone was lying to get her team to do extra work.
  - In this same meeting [REDACTED] clarified that she was frustrated at the fact that the tech services team always built the thumb drives and her team was unaware that this was taking place.
  - While the IS director was in [REDACTED] office, [REDACTED] was seen running past [REDACTED] office heading for the warehouse.
  - The IS director went to the warehouse and found [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] office and was asked to explain what happened and to ensure they did their own work and not attempting to pass work to the programming team.
  - According to the IS Director, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stated that the programming team had always created the database build and that the thumb drives were created from that build. It was stated in such a way that gave the appearances that [REDACTED] misunderstood the request and took it the wrong way.
  - [REDACTED] is adamant about the fact that her or her team has NEVER created any thumb drives for the ePoll books.
  - [REDACTED] also recognizes the security risks in putting the entire voter registration information on the thumb drives and would never agree to it, or allow it.
  - [REDACTED] did recall a situation where there was an issue with the database back in 2016 and [REDACTED] had to update all the ePoll tablets; but insisted that only fulltime staff be allowed to use the thumb drives because she didn't trust temp workers or the thumb drive process.
  - OCVotes was first implemented in August of 2014.
  - This situation only came to light because [REDACTED] did not train his replacements ([REDACTED]) on how to create the thumb drives. [REDACTED] did instruct [REDACTED] to train his replacements on all of his previous job duties and the IS director offered to buy pizza and have a working lunch(s) to allow for the training to take place.
- How the build process was initially described to the IS director by tech services:
  - A build is done to create the ePoll books and a database with ALL voter information is placed on the secure internal file server.
  - After early voting has completed and an incremental database is built containing voter information for those people who voted. This information is placed on the thumb drive to update the HDOP ePoll tablets. This build is done Sunday before the election.
- How the build process actually works according to [REDACTED]

### Exhibit 3

#### Investigation into the creation of ePoll Books thumb drives

- A build is done to create the ePoll books and a database with ALL voter information is placed on the secure internal file server.
- After early voting has completed another build of the database is performed and this contains ALL voter information and this information that's placed on the internal file server.
- Monday morning the HDOP tablets are built by tech services. The data base is downloaded from the internal file server to the tablet. Additionally supplemental data is downloaded from our file server to the HDOP tablet.
- The thumb drive that is provided with the HDOP tablet contains the voter registration information.
- The HDOP will insert the thumb drive into their tablet when they are at the polling location and the entire data base is loaded onto the thumb drive.
- The HDOP will then use that same thumb drive to update the other ePoll books at the polling station.
- Once the thumb drives are returned with the ePoll tablets, they are not erased and the full voter registration database remains on it.




### Exhibit 3


## Investigation into the creation of ePoll Books thumb drives

- IS Directors Notes:

- On 5/23 there was a meeting in the tablet room to discuss transition of responsibilities for the build server. Attendees were [REDACTED] and Brian Freid.
- Towards the end of the meeting, [REDACTED] asked about the tablets and noted there were clear pouches glued to each containing a thumb drive.
- [REDACTED] also commented on the fact that some of the thumb drives appeared to be missing.



- [REDACTED] commented that the thumb drives were used to copy the databases onto the ePoll Books.
- [REDACTED] asked about the size of the database files on the thumb drives and [REDACTED] was able to quickly find one that had a database on it.
- On 5/24 Brian Freid went into the tablet room and picked up 2 thumb drives at random and upon plugging them into his computer noticed that one had the database for the august 2020 primary and the other had the database for the November 2020 presidential election.
- The thumb drives are contained with notes and evidence. Screen prints of contents are as follows:



### Exhibit 3

## Investigation into the creation of ePoll Books thumb drives

Name	Size	Type
Snap	172.20.10.155	Folder
WaterFocus	172.20.10.155	Folder
4E	172.20.10.155	Folder
vol	172.20.10.155	Folder
SCAN	172.20.10.155	Folder
Technical Services	172.20.10.155	Folder
OCVotes.pdf		File

- There are major security concerns raised during the investigation, which are:
  1. Could not find certification of OCVotes from the state. ██████████ stated the last day of her employment that she lost a number of emails. This information was conveyed to the IS Director towards the end of ██████████ employment at the SOE office.
  2. There shouldn't be a need for using thumb drives, should implement primary/secondary architecture.
  3. If we were to continue using thumb drives, the person in charge of creating these thumb drives should be the IS director.
  4. The database is password protected, but the password has been stored in a piece of software called keypass which many members of the SOE staff have had access to it over the years.
  5. There are no checks and balances to ensure the appropriate number of thumb drives have been created, distributed and returned.
  6. There's no security preventing someone from plugging that thumb drive into an unauthorized device and copping the data
  7. There's been little control over how many thumb drives go out and how many come back.
  8. The data base on the thumb drive contains all voter information relating to voting, including protected voters.
  9. The data base on the thumb drive is not encrypted.
  10. The thumb drive itself is not encrypted.
  11. We have no way of knowing of the full, unprotected, voter registration data base has been leaked outside of this office.

**Conclusion:** There are a number of security risks that have been identified and too many unknown questions that warrant further investigation into this situation. The SOE office is not equipped to perform this investigation on their own and request assistance.